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8.1 Introduction
Should governments privatize state-owned enterprises (SOEs)? What
is the impact of existing privatization programs? These are important re-
search questions that have motivated an enormous amount of economic
research during the past decade. According to a few recent literature sur-
veys (Djankov and Murrell 2002; Megginson and Netter 2001; Toninelli
2000), the accumulated research seems to have converged on the view that
privatization is critical to reform SOEs and many of the implemented pri-
vatization programs have had a positive impact on enterprise performance.
Thanks to this research, our knowledge on these important questions has
greatly improved.
But why do governments choose to privatize SOEs? More generally, why
do governments choose to part with, or dump, SOEs by either transferring
their ownership to private hands or liquidating the enterprises? In many
ways, these are even more important and relevant questions than the open-
ing questions that have generated the huge privatization literature. After
all, there are no obvious reasons to believe that in reality governments faith-
fully follow economists’ advice on major economic policy issues such as pri-
vatization. Policymakers often seem to have their own considerations and
agenda. With a better understanding of why governments (do not) choose
to privatize, the obstacles to eﬃciency-enhancing privatization might be
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Unfortunately, there is a very limited literature on why governments
choose to dump SOEs, although one can identify a few general streams of
thinking on this issue. In some cases, there is limited formal research, es-
pecially empirical research, along each of the streams.
The ﬁrst group of general theories argues that governments dump SOEs
in order to enhance enterprise eﬃciency. In fact, most theoretical research
on privatization simply starts from this premise and derives various pre-
dictions. Underlying this thinking is the belief that, somehow, the political
marketplace is eﬃcient and the equilibrium of the political game is econom-
ically eﬃcient. In a larger context, Glaeser, Johnson, and Shleifer (2001)
call this the Coasian theory of institutions. But why, in reality, does there
seem to be a common phenomenon—that many eﬃciency-enhancing
privatization programs fail to be implemented due to government objec-
tions? At least, we need empirical tests of such theories of government de-
cisions of privatization.
The second line of thinking explains that governments dump state en-
terprises in order to enhance their revenue rather than eﬃciency.1 Privati-
zation or liquidation of SOEs may bring in sales revenues to the govern-
ment. Privatization also may increase the future ﬂow of tax revenue when
the eﬃciency of the privatized enterprises increases enough and tax en-
forcement is strong enough. Finally, in the case of proﬁt-losing SOEs, pri-
vatization or liquidation of such enterprises relieves governments of the
burden of ﬁnancial subsidies. In the Chinese context, Cao, Qian, and Wein-
gast (1999) argue that governments privatize due to their facing harder
budget constraints. However, without enterprise-level data, they cannot
directly test this hypothesis. Using a data set of China’s township and vil-
lage enterprises, Brandt, Li, and Roberts (2001) ﬁnd that when local banks
faced tighter liquidity constraints, it was more likely that local collective
enterprises were privatized. It is interesting to test this line of thinking
against the ﬁrst one.
The third line of thinking is that governments dump SOEs as a strategic
move in political games. For example, it is often suggested that reformist
politicians in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union chose mass pri-
vatization in order to secure political support for further reforms (see, e.g.,
Shleifer and Treisman 2000). In the context of Western Europe, it might be
that conservative parties in power use privatization or liquidation of SOEs
in order to weaken labor unions and therefore the political basis of the la-
bor party of social democrats. For example, Biais and Perotti (1998) model
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1. Under a set of strict conditions (including a perfect capital market, nondistortionary
taxes, and a fully competitive product market), maximizing privatization revenue or govern-
ment tax revenue or stopping ﬁnancial losses is equivalent to maximizing social eﬃciency. We
certainly do not think these conditions are satisﬁed in the economies we are concerned with.how a right-wing government can use mass privatization to get reelected.
Plausible as it is, this explanation for the motivation of privatization has yet
to be put to systematic empirical tests.
The purpose of this chapter is to ﬁll the gap in the literature by empiri-
cally testing competing theories of why governments dump (i.e., privatize
or liquidate) SOEs. We are able to do this thanks to a unique data set of
Chinese state enterprises, in which some were privatized or liquidated while
the rest remained state owned. The focus of the test is on the ﬁrst two
groups of theories of government motivations of privatization, since in the
Chinese context, political moves are often covert and we do not have reli-
able information on them. However, we are able to estimate the relative
level of the political beneﬁt of control to the government with SOEs.
In order to facilitate the test, we ﬁrst set up a simple theoretical model
that is general enough to incorporate various explanations as special cases.
We then derive predictions of the simple model, linking them to the hy-
pothesized government preference. Empirical estimations of the underly-
ing parameters provide us with inferences on government preferences and
therefore yield tests of diﬀerent theories of why governments privatize.
Our simple model of privatization is based on a bargaining game be-
tween a government and the workers of the SOE. The government is as-
sumed to have a general objective function consisting of the enterprise’s
eﬃciency and revenue contribution and the political beneﬁt of control to
the government. The issue of the burden of ﬁnancial subsidies to poorly
performing SOEs is also modeled by allowing the government to treat neg-
ative  revenue asymmetrically from positive revenue. The workers care
about employment (or unemployment) and total wages. Privatization or
liquidation of SOEs may cause changes in eﬃciency, in total revenue to
workers and the government, in employment, and in the political beneﬁt of
control of the government. These changes are anticipated by both parties
when they negotiate the decision to privatize or liquidate, so that the equi-
librium takes these factors into account.
The simple model predicts when privatization or liquidation is imple-
mented based on the underlying parameters of the government objective
function as well as changes to the SOE due to privatization. By testing this
prediction against observed data on privatization, we are able to estimate
the parameters of the government’s objective function and therefore test
diﬀerent theories of privatization.
The empirical tests reject the eﬃciency theory while supporting the rev-
enue theory. They show that none of the alternative measures of eﬃciency
increases has predictive power with regard to the privatization-or-
liquidation decision. On the other hand, increases in revenue to the gov-
ernment are important in predicting the decision. In particular, a signiﬁ-
cant factor inducing the privatization-liquidation decision is delayed loan
and interest payment when it becomes a ﬁnancial burden to the government.
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over, other things being equal, the more surplus workers there are and the
greater the government’s political beneﬁt of control of the enterprise, the
less likely is the SOE to be privatized or liquidated. Overall, the main mes-
sage of the tests is that governments dump SOEs not for the purpose of in-
creasing eﬃciency but for enhancing tax revenue, or for relieving them-
selves of the ﬁnancial burden of subsidizing proﬁt-losing state enterprises.
Section 8.2 of the paper describes the simple model of privatization and
its predictions. Section 8.3 explains the design of the empirical tests and
measurement of variables. Test results are presented in section 8.4, and sec-
tion 8.5 summarizes the paper with discussions on some policy implications.
8.2 A Simple Model of Privatization
Two parties are most critical in the privatization decision of a state en-
terprise, and the model focuses on them. The ﬁrst is the government
agency, which is in control of the senior managers of an SOE. The govern-
ment agency and the senior managers of an SOE who are government oﬃ-
cials can be viewed as one entity and have important decision rights in pri-
vatizing of the enterprise. The other party is the workers, who have been
oﬀered long-term employment by the SOE and can demand compensation
when they become unemployed. For simplicity, we assume that both par-
ties have to agree before a privatization decision can be made.
To be general, we suppose that the government may be concerned with
three possible objectives associated with an enterprise: economic eﬃciency
of the enterprise, revenue contribution from the enterprise to the govern-
ment, and political beneﬁt of control from the enterprise. The possible
concern for eﬃciency comes from the government’s desire to seek the soci-
ety’s economic prosperity. The preference for tax revenue is often argued to
be common among bureaucrats of various kinds. Finally, government oﬃ-
cials derive the political beneﬁt of control by gaining direct control of an
SOE, as many have illustrated (e.g., Kornai 1978, 1992). The general pref-
erence of the government is the same regardless of whether an SOE is pri-
vatized or not. But each of the entries in the objective function may change
after privatization. In particular, the political beneﬁt of control is supposed
to be zero when the ﬁrm is private. We assume the relative weight on each
of the three elements to be  ,  , and 1, respectively. We can write the ob-
jective function of the government as
(1) W G    t    T   B,
where e is a measure of economic eﬃciency of the enterprise (whether it
is state owned or privatized); T is the equivalent of per-period revenue the
government gets, and B is the political beneﬁt of control (which is zero
when the enterprise is private).
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budget constraint, which refers to the phenomenon that SOEs expect to be
bailed out when in ﬁnancial diﬃculty. An alternative way to interpret the
soft budget constraint is that the government tolerates negative revenue, T,
from the operation of the enterprise. The opposite of the soft budget con-
straint is the hard budget constraint, which makes the government feel ex-
tra pain with negative Tand thus makes it likely to make changes in the op-
eration of the enterprise rather than passively subsidize it. Based on this
analysis, we introduce an extra term to equation (1) to capture the softness
of the budget constraint:
(2) W G    e    T    SD(T)T   B
where D(T)   1 if T   0, and D(T)   0 otherwise. The coeﬃcient  S is
meant to capture the phenomenon of the soft budget constraint. The lower
the value of  S, the softer the budget constraint is. Intuitively,  S is the ex-
tra pain a single unit of loss of proﬁt causes to the government.
Turning to workers’ objectives, we focus on two concerns. First, they are
concerned with layoﬀs. Second, other things being equal, an increase in the
total wage bill beneﬁts all workers. Thus, a reduction in employment must
be compensated by an increase in the total wage bill paid to the same group
of workers in the form of wages and unemployment compensation. Let the
size of employment be L and the per-period wage bill be W, and let the rel-
ative weights on them be 1 and  , respectively. We write down the objective
function of the workers as
(3) W L   L    W.
An interpretation of the objective of the workers is that if the privatiza-
tion results in the layoﬀ of one worker, then the extra compensation paid
to the worker must be  .
We are now ready to analyze the conditions under which privatization
may occur. Obviously, such a decision is an outcome of negotiations be-
tween the government and the workers, and compensation from the gov-
ernment to workers may be necessary. Suppose that M is the monetary
equivalent of the monthly perpetual amount of transfer from the govern-
ment to workers needed in order for the latter to agree to privatization.
In order for the workers to agree to a plan of privatization, it must be that
(4)  W L    L    ( W   M)   0,
where the diﬀerences are taken between the value of privatization and no
privatization.
At the same time, the government must also ﬁnd privatization to be
worthwhile, i.e.,
(5)  W G      e    ( T   M)    S [D(T)T]    B   0.
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two multiplied inequalities, we have
(6)    e      L      ( W    T)      S[ D(T)T]      B   0.
We deﬁne
R   W   T,
which is the total amount of cash ﬂow of the enterprise that can be divided
among government and workers. Equation (6) can be rewritten as
(7)    e      L      R      S[ D(T)T]      B   0.
We make two assumptions to further simplify equation (7). First, we as-
sume that after privatization, there is no need for the government to bear a
negative loss of the enterprise (i.e., T is always positive after privatization).
We use TSto denote the value of government revenue collection from SOEs.
Second, the political beneﬁt of control to the government after privatiza-
tion is zero. We denote the political beneﬁt of control associated with SOEs
as BS. Equation (7) can be simpliﬁed as
(8)    e      R      SD(TS)TS      L    BS   0.
A simple interpretation of equation (8) is that in order for an SOE to be
privatized, a combination of the eﬃciency gain, the increase in cash ﬂow
R, and the preprivatization proﬁt-loss must be high enough to overcome
the combination of the layoﬀ of workers and the loss of political beneﬁt of
control of the government. Another way to interpret equation (8) is to look
at the impact of the government’s and the workers’ preferences on the pri-
vatization decision. Other things being equal, a higher   (i.e., govern-
ment’s putting more weight on eﬃciency) makes privatization more likely
to happen, since  e is positive. When   R    L is positive, i.e., when the
increase in cash ﬂow from privatization is suﬃcient to compensate layoﬀ
of workers so that a surplus is left for the government, a higher   also
makes privatization more likely to happen. Finally, so long as  is not zero,
a higher  S (i.e., a harder budget constraint) makes privatization more
plausible.
Notice that equation (8) is general enough for us to test various hy-
potheses of why privatization was implemented. Although we may not be
able to identify each of the parameters of  ,  , and  , we will be able to es-
timate the coeﬃcients on each of the variables of  e,  R, D(T S), TS,  L,
and BS. The hypothesis that eﬃciency gain is a cause of privatization can
be tested by estimating the coeﬃcient of  e; the estimated coeﬃcients of
 R and D(T S)TS are the bases for testing the hypotheses that increasing
revenue, or hardening the budget constraint, are causes of privatization, re-
spectively.
216 David D. Li and Francis T. Lui8.3 The Data and Design of the Empirical Tests
8.3.1 The Data Set
The data set we use is based on three surveys of several hundred Chinese
SOEs covering the 1980–1999 period. The ﬁrst survey was conducted in
1990 by a research team consisting of economists from the Chinese Acad-
emy of Social Sciences (CASS), Oxford University, and the University of
Michigan. The survey has information on 769 SOEs from 1980 to 1989.
The second survey was implemented in 1995 by researchers from the CASS
and the University of Michigan, and collected information on the same
group of enterprises from 1990 to 1994. Of the original 769 sample enter-
prises, 680 remained valid in the second survey. The third survey was spon-
sored by a consortium of researchers from mainland China, Hong Kong,
and the United States. Carried out in early 2000, the survey obtained in-
formation retrospectively on the sampled enterprises from 1994 to 1999
(with overlapping information of 1994 for the purpose of quality control).
Putting all three surveys together, we have a data set of a substantial num-
ber of China’s SOEs throughout the twenty years of reform.
The sample of the enterprises came from four provinces and ﬁve sectors
and represented mostly manufacturing ﬁrms. Unlike surveys of the SOEs
conducted by government agencies, the two surveys were carefully de-
signed and pilot-tested by economics researchers. The data set contains
detailed information on the operations and ﬁnancial information of the
SOEs in the sample. It also contains qualitative information from the sen-
ior managements of the SOEs. The ﬁrst part of the data set was widely used
in studies such as Groves et al. (1994), Groves et al. (1995), and Li (1997).
What makes our empirical test possible is that in the third enterprise sur-
vey, conducted in 2000, about 200 of the original sample of 680 “disap-
peared”; i.e., these enterprises no longer existed at the time of survey in
early 2000. Subsequently, the survey team made major eﬀorts in ﬁnding
out what happened to most of these enterprises. It turned out that the
majority of these former SOEs were either privatized or liquidated (i.e.,
“dumped”) by their supervising government agencies. The rest, of course,
were still SOEs but were merged with other state enterprises and therefore
disappeared from the sample.
The dumped SOEs fell into two large categories: privatization and bank-
ruptcy/liquidation. There were several cases of privatization, including
sales to private individuals (often, the chief manager) or private enter-
prises, mergers with township and village enterprises (TVEs), and take-
overs by foreign enterprises. Figure 8.1provides a breakdown of the major
categories of the cases.
Regarding the dumped SOEs, the survey team could not get as detailed
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fore the change. The survey provides information on when the identity
change happened, who bought the ownership shares of the enterprise
(when relevant), and what happened to the workers (in many but not all
cases).
8.3.2 The Design of the Econometric Test
Our empirical tests closely follow the theoretical model as summarized
in inequality (8). Let yi be the dependent variable, which is equal to 1 if en-
terprise i was dumped by the government between 1995 and 2000; other-
wise it is zero. In our empirical tests, we do not distinguish the two subcat-
egories of privatization and bankruptcy/liquidation, since the theoretical
model is applicable to both cases. Our econometric model is
(9) prob{yi   1}   prob[   ei      Ri      SD(T Si)TSi
     Li    BSi   εi   0],
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Fig. 8.1 Type distribution (all 681 enterprises)
Notes: 1   SOEs without ownership changes; 2   SOEs merged or acquired by other SOEs;
3   SOEs acquired by foreign invested ﬁrms; 4   SOEs acquired by urban collective enter-
prises; 5   SOEs that were liquidated; 6   SOEs in bankruptcy procedures; 7   SOEs auc-
tioned or leased out; 8   SOEs that become share-holding cooperatives; 9   SOEs that dis-
appeared and could not be identiﬁed. We treat cases 3 to 8 as privatization or liquidation.where all the variables are the same as those explained before and the error
term εi is introduced due to omitted variables that we cannot observe. We
assume that the error term follows a normal distribution. Due to the wide
variations in the size of enterprises in the sample, it is unreasonable to as-
sume that the error term has the same standard deviation across diﬀerent
enterprises. Instead, we believe that for larger ﬁrms, the privatization deci-
sion invokes more considerations not captured by the model. Therefore, we
assume that the error term for large ﬁrms has a larger standard deviation
than for small ﬁrms. In particular, we assume that the standard deviation
of the error term is proportional to the size of the labor force of the ﬁrm.
This means that in the actual implementation, we divide all of the inde-
pendent variables by the size of the employment of the enterprise.
8.3.3 Measurement of Variables
The dependent variable yi is zero for enterprises that remained state-
owned by early 2000, including those that were merged with other SOEs.
The variable yi is equal to 1 if the ith enterprise had been either privatized
or bankrupt/liquidated by 2000—corresponding to categories 3 to 8 in ﬁg-
ure 8.1. From the point of view of the theory, both cases are the same, rep-
resenting the situation that the government decided to get rid of control of
the enterprise.
We measure the eﬃciency gain  ei in two alternative ways. First, we use
an estimated increase in the gross rate of return on total assets of the enter-
prise after the identity change, whether it is actual or counterfactual. The
gross rate of return on total assets is deﬁned as the total amount of value-
added of the enterprises (which is available to pay wages and bonuses, taxes,
bank interest, etc.) divided by the total value of the assets. Unfortunately,
we do not have data on the gross rate of return for those privatized SOEs.
Neither do we have observations on the counterfactual cases of privatiza-
tion for those unprivatized SOEs. Fortunately, in the last survey (conducted
in 2000), we have a sample of about 300 non-state-owned enterprises. We
calculate the average rate of return on assets for industry groups of these
ﬁrms and use the averages for privatized SOEs. That is,  eiwas constructed
as the diﬀerence between the industry average gross rate of return on assets
of non-state-owned enterprises and the average of SOEs from 1990 to 1994.
Alternatively, we measure  ei by potential increases in labor productiv-
ity when a privatized enterprise lays oﬀ those surplus workers while main-
taining the same production level as before. In the surveys, enterprise man-
agers provided information on the maximal amount of workers who could
be laid oﬀ without aﬀecting current production of the enterprise. In the
case of liquidation, we still calculate the index. Under the assumption that
productive workers (not including surplus workers) of the liquidated en-
terprise are transferred to a similar production facility in the same in-
dustry, the index also captures the potential productivity increase.
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vatization or liquidation, cannot be fully observed in the data set due to the
lack of information on the operation of privatized enterprises. By deﬁni-
tion,  Ri is not a measure of social-welfare or social-eﬃciency gain, since
it only aﬀects the welfare of the government and workers. For example, cut-
ting a surplus worker does not change  Ri, since the saved wage bill for the
government comes from the same amount of loss of the aﬀected worker.
Cutting a surplus worker does increase social eﬃciency, as captured by  ei.
In order to implement the econometric model, we partially parameterize
 Ri. We assume that  Ri consists of two parts: observed and unobserved.
The observed part is based on the information of how the enterprise was
losing proﬁt before its potential identity change. The data set describes the
percentage of the output that is losing proﬁt. It is reasonable to assume that
after being privatized or liquidated, the enterprise will sell the part of the
asset that produces such outputs. The value of the assets, which is assumed
to be proportional to the proﬁt-losing output, constitutes part of the
source of enhanced revenue for the government and workers. Using an in-
terest rate of 5 percent, we convert the one-time increase in cash ﬂow to
perpetual increase in cash ﬂow and deﬁne this as Si. Moreover, through
other channels, the privatization can also increase the total amount of cash
ﬂow for the government and workers to share. Not being able to observe it,
we suppose it is proportional to the total value of the remaining asset. The
proportion depends on observed attributions of the enterprise before be-
ing privatized, such as which industry the enterprise is in and how much re-
form it had implemented as an SOE. In summary, we assume
 Ri Si   (a1 industry1   a2industry2   ...     aJindustryJ   b1 reform1
  ...   aR reformR)Ai    i,
where Si is immediate and observable cost saving obtainable through pri-
vatization or liquidation; a1 industry1 ...   are industry dummies; reform1
...   are reform dummies, preprivatization; Ai is the value of asset of the en-
terprise; and  iis the error term due to omitted variables, which is assumed
to follow a normal distribution with standard deviation proportional to
employment of the enterprise (an index of enterprise size), since for larger
ﬁrms the estimation formula is likely to be disproportionately inaccurate.
Ti, which is the negative cash ﬂow of the SOE borne by the government
before privatization or liquidation, is estimated by two methods. The ﬁrst
alternative uses the average negative proﬁt plus sale tax incurred by the en-
terprise for three years, 1992 to 1994. The other alternative is the total ac-
cumulated delayed bank loan and interest payment, which is a measure of
cumulative poor ﬁnancial performance. The advantage of using delayed
bank loan and interest payment is that this reﬂects a longer-run problem
than negative proﬁt.
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gressions, multiplying them by an index of how much burden the poor per-
formance of the enterprise created for the government. We call this sbci,
which takes a value of zero if the manager of the SOE enterprise said that
he did not get any help from the government in the case of dealing with de-
layed payment of bank loan. This is a case in which accumulated ﬁnancial
loss had not become a problem for the government. The value of sbci is 4 if
the manager answered that he had obtained the most important help from
the government on the issue. It takes a value of 1 , 2, or 3 in the intermedi-
ate cases. The higher the value of sbci, the more burden the government felt
facing each unit of ﬁnancial loss of the enterprise.
 Li, which is the reduction in employment due to the privatization or
liquidation of the state enterprise (thus, it is mostly negative), can be cal-
culated based on observed variables. For each case of privatization and liq-
uidation, the survey has speciﬁc information on what happened to the
workers; e.g., a certain percentage of workers were transferred to a unem-
ployment agency and a certain percentage of workers were provided with
new employment in the privatized enterprise. For those enterprises with-
out identity changes, we use the total number of surplus workers as a proxy
of  Li, since those workers would most likely have been cut had the SOE
been dumped.
Finally, for the political beneﬁt of control associated with an SOE, Bi,
we again have to parameterize due to the inability to observe. We suppose
that Bi depends on the preprivatization size of employment, total value of
ﬁxed asset, and the level of the supervising government agency (central,
provincial, or county). That is, we assume
Bi   ciLi   ciVi   ciCentrali   ciProvincei   ciCountyi    i,
where Li is employment; Vi value of ﬁxed asset; Centrali, . . . , are govern-
ment-level dummies; and  i is the error term due to omitted variables,
which we assume to have a standard deviation proportional to the size of
employment.
In summary, we estimate the following probit regression:
(10) prob{yi   1}   prob{   ei      [Si   (a1industry1
  a2industry2   ...     aJindustryJ   b1reform1
  ...   aRreformR)Ai]      SD(T Si)TSi      Li
   (ciLi   ciVi   ciCentrali   ciProvincei
  ciCountyi)    i   0},
where  i is the combined error term, which still follows a normal distribu-
tion with standard deviation proportional to the size of the enterprise (in-
dexed by the size of employment).
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Among the 681 sample enterprises, 122 were either privatized or liqui-
dated at any time between 1995 and 2000. The rest remained SOEs (see ﬁg.
8.2 for details). Comparing the two groups of sample enterprises, one ma-
jor diﬀerence is size. Among those privatized or liquidated, about 4 percent
were large enterprises, while 27 percent of those remaining SOEs were
large enterprises. This is consistent with the government policies of “let go
the small and medium and grab tight the large,” which has been imple-
mented since the early 1990s with regard to SOE reform. Our test takes this
into account.
Table 8.1 lists the summary statistics of the independent variables. Sev-
222 David D. Li and Francis T. Lui
Fig. 8.2 The sample distributioneral patterns are noticeable. Total employment, value of output, and ﬁxed
asset value are bigger for an average remaining SOE than for a privatized
or liquidated enterprise. Likewise, the same pattern holds for such vari-
ables as change of employment, delayed loan payments, and total wage bill
of surplus workers. However, the diﬀerence in the latter set of variables be-
tween the two groups of sample enterprises is proportionately much less
than those of the former set of variables. Intuitively, using one of the for-
mer sets of variables as the weight, a regression using the latter group of
variables should provide predicative powers. This is the statistical essence
of the test results, which we explain below.
The estimation results of the probit regressions are given in table 8.2.
There are a few consistent ﬁndings across the regressions. First, the results
show that eﬃciency, whether measured by increases in the rate of return
on assets or by improvements in labor productivity, is not a signiﬁcant fac-
tor in the decision on privatization or liquidation. Second, the variables
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Table 8.1 Summary Statistics of Regression Sample
Mean SD
Privatized or liquidated enterprises
Diﬀerence in rate of return on assets with/without privatization 0.07 0.28
Labor productivity improvement by cutting surplus labor 0.54 0.57
Diﬀerence in total employment with/without privatization –234 1,049
Total assets used in unproﬁtable production 583.50 2871.40
Delayed loan and interest payment 133.14 365.49
(Index of the burden of subsidies) * (delayed loan and interest payment) 318.78 854.64
Proﬁt loss 75.90 105.65
(Index of the burden of subsidies) * (proﬁt loss) 130.59 236.06
Total employment, preprivatization 822 1,039
Total output, preprivatization 1,781.66 3600.84
Net ﬁxed asset, preprivatization 913.76 1438.90
No. of observations 122
Remaining state enterprises
Diﬀerence in rate of return on assets with/without privatization –0.07 0.26
Labor productivity improvement by cutting surplus labor 1.56 11.35
Diﬀerence in total employment with/without privatization –641 1,192
Total assets used in unproﬁtable production 1,076.39 3,474.93
Delayed loan and interest payment 241.90 1,006.94
(Index of the burden of subsidies) * (delayed loan and interest payment) 450.10 1,904.59
Proﬁt loss 96.66 261.81
(Index of the burden of subsidies) * (proﬁt loss) 146.73 466.08
Total employment 2,214 3,740
Total output 10,633 32217
Net ﬁxed asset 5,363.9 2,230.9
No. of observations 559
Note: Unit   RMB 10,000 (wherever applicable). SD = standard deviation.Table 8.2 Heteroskedastic Probit Regressions: The Determinants of State Enterprises’
Privatization or Liquidation Decisions
Regression Regression Regression Regression
1234
Diﬀerence in rate of return on assets –222.20*** –222.20*** –222.22*** –222.22***
with/without privatization (1.64) (1.45)
Labor productivity improvement by  0.95 1.34
cutting surplus labor (0.19) (0.26)
Diﬀerence in total employment with/ 1.37*** 1.42*** 1.32*** 1.28***
without privatization (4.38) (4.56) (4.18) (4.05)
Corporatization-reform dummy 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.13
(0.69) (0.75) (0.69) (0.79)
Mining and utility industry 0.04 –0.03 0.08 0.02
(0.21) (–0.13) (0.35) (0.08)
Light manufacturing industry 0.24 0.22 0.27 0.27
(1.32) (1.27) (1.45) (1.46)
Chemical industry –0.22 –0.25 –0.24 –0.24
(–1.04) (–1.18) (–1.09) (–1.11)
Heavy manufacturing industry 0.01 –0.006 0.05 0.06
(0.07) (–0.03) (0.29) (0.35)
Enterprise-size dummy 0.30*** 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.36***
(2.58) (2.77) (2.79) (3.01)
Total assets used in unproﬁtable  0.11* 0.12** 0.05 0.04
production (1.86) (1.98) (0.81) (0.65)
Delayed loan and interest payment –0.47 –0.48
(–1.35) (–1.37)
(Index of the burden of subsidies)   0.35** 0.35**
(delayed loan and interest payment) (2.26) (2.29)
Proﬁt loss –0.82 –0.37
(–0.79) (–0.39)
(Index of the burden of subsidies)   0.93* 0.86*
(proﬁt loss) (1.88) (1.78)
Total employment, preprivatization –0.37** –0.29* –0.39** –0.38**
(–2.15) (–1.73) (–2.22) (–2.15)
Total output, preprivatization –0.16*** –0.18*** –0.15*** –0.16***
(–4.38) (–4.81) (–4.02) (–4.25)
Net ﬁxed asset, preprivatization –0.34* –0.31* –0.39** –0.39**
(–1.81) (–1.73) (–2.03) (–2.05)
Central-government dummy –67.10 –88.27 –74.77 –72.05
(–0.27) (–0.36) (–0.31) (–0.30)
Province-government dummy –328.55** –318.44** –370.02** –364.83**
(–2.14) (–2.14) (–2.43) (–2.47)
City-government dummy –58.80 –70.83 –84.57 –93.26
(–0.58) (–0.70) (–0.84) (–0.93)
Constant 417.09*** 400.32*** 443.86*** 429.15***
(3.91) (3.75) (4.21) (4.07)
No. of observations 652 657 652 651
R2 0.2889 0.2864 0.2842 0.2824
Notes: Dependent variable   1 if privatized or liquidated, 0 otherwise. We assume the standard devia-
tion of the error term is proportional to size of employment. Z-ratios are in parentheses.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.measuring changes in available cash ﬂow for the government and workers
are mostly positive and statistically signiﬁcant, supporting the hypothesis
that the privatization or liquidation decision is driven by increasing gov-
ernment revenue. Third, although the total delayed loan plus interest pay-
ment is not statistically signiﬁcant, it becomes signiﬁcant when multiplied
by the index of the burden of ﬁnancial subsidies, which is zero if the enter-
prise obtained no help from the government in dealing with loan payment
and 4 if it received the most important help from the government. In other
words, the accumulated dept per se is not a cause pushing for privatization
or liquidation. But when a high level of bad debt becomes a major ﬁnan-
cial burden to the government, it is eﬀective in inducing the privatization
or liquidation decisions of the government. Finally, the regressions show
that the larger the unemployment associated with privatization or liquida-
tion, the less likely the government will be to dump the SOE, as the coeﬃ-
cients on the unemployment term are negative and statistically signiﬁcant.
How economically signiﬁcant are the variables in aﬀecting the decision
of privatization or liquidation? Table 8.3 calculates the increases in the
probability of privatization or liquidation due an increase in those statisti-
cally signiﬁcant variables. It shows that a 1-standard-deviation increase in
layoﬀ due to privatization or liquidation decreases the probability of pri-
vatization or liquidation by 57 to 61 percent. A similar change in total as-
sets used in unproﬁtable production increases the probability by 8 to 10
percent. Similar changes in delayed loan and interest payment multiplied
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Table 8.3 Increases in the Probability of Privatization or Liquidation Due to Increments in
Independent Variables
Regression Regression Regression Regression
1234
Diﬀerence in total employment with/
without privatization 0.6127 0.5901 0.5962 0.5732
Enterprise-size dummy (from large to 
small or medium) 0.0002 0.0001 0.00005 0.00005
Total assets used on unproﬁtable 
production 0.0827 0.1042
(Index of the burden of subsidies)  
(delayed loan and interest payment) 0.0555 0.0340 0.0493 0.0405
Total employment, preprivatization –0.0663 –0.0441 –0.0758 –0.0610
Total production value, preprivatization –0.0681 –0.0466 –0.0774 –0.0621
Net ﬁxed assets, preprivatization –0.0681 –0.0466 –0.0774 –0.0621
Province-government dummy (from 
having a nonprovincial to a provincial 
supervising government agency) –0.0388 –0.0275 –0.0475 –0.0391
Notes: Probability change under standard normal distribution assumption. Omitted are those indepen-
dent variables which are not statistically signiﬁcant. Except for the dummy variables, the amount of in-
crease in all independent variables is 1 standard deviation of the variable.by the index of the burden of subsidies increases the probability by 3 to 5
percent.
8.5 Concluding Remarks
The enormous amount of literature on privatization has mostly focused
on the question of whether and how governments should privatize SOEs as
well as on the impact of existing privatization programs. We argue that an
equally important question is why governments in reality (do not) choose
to dump SOEs through privatization or liquidation. The lack of research
on this question leaves us with three general theories, explaining that gov-
ernments dump SOEs in order to maximize economic eﬃciency, govern-
ment revenue, and political beneﬁts.
Utilizing panel data from China, in which some SOEs were dumped and
others remained state owned, we are able to test the eﬃciency and revenue
theories of why governments privatize or liquidate SOEs. The tests reject
the eﬃciency theory and provide support for the revenue theory. In addi-
tion, the ﬁndings reveal that the motive of getting rid of the ﬁnancial bur-
den of subsidizing poorly performing SOEs is important. Moreover, we
ﬁnd that avoiding unemployment and losing the government’s political
beneﬁts of control of SOEs are important considerations preventing pri-
vatization or liquidation decisions.
On privatization issues, economists tend to propose the ﬁrst-best pro-
grams, aiming at maximizing social eﬃciency. However, the ﬁndings in the
paper show that, in reality, the key decision maker, the government, takes
revenue maximization as an objective and is concerned with unemploy-
ment. First-best programs are often blocked by the government. Therefore,
in order for a privatization program to be feasible, it might be sensible to
advocate second-best programs of privatization or liquidation that take
government concerns into account while enhancing social eﬃciency.
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Comment Deunden Nikomborirak
This paper tries to explain the underlying governments’ motivation in pri-
vatizing public enterprises by using empirical data from over 600 SOEs,
about 120 of which “disappeared” during the 1994–2000 period. The con-
clusion is that governments privatize SOEs mainly to generate revenue
rather than to promote eﬃciency and that the government is particularly
concerned about the loss of political beneﬁts associated with public enter-
prises. While I ﬁnd the attempt to conduct empirical tests on government
motivation for privatization interesting, the lack of suﬃcient data on post-
privatization enterprises renders the empirical support for said conclu-
sions quite weak.
First, one must be careful in trying to form conclusions with regard to ex
ante motivation by using ex post data. Motivations are based on expected
rather than actual results. Second, the classiﬁcation of privatized enter-
prises on the basis of state equity shares may not be appropriate. Accord-
ing to the authors, privatized enterprises include state enterprises that are
liquidated, bankrupt, or sold to private individuals. It is not certain, how-
ever, whether the selling of state enterprises always translates into transfer
of corporate control to the private sector. For example, if the government
retains a minority share, does that mean that the privatized entity func-
tions completely like a private enterprise? If not, we cannot expect the pri-
vatized entity to operate any diﬀerently simply from the partial transfer of
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nomics program at the Thailand Development Research Institute.state equity ownership to the private sector. Third, proxies used to capture
the three diﬀerent motives for privatization—namely, eﬃciency, revenue
generation, and political beneﬁts—have several ﬂaws, as will be elaborated
below.
The use of ﬁnancial performance (i.e., gross rate of return) as a proxy for
eﬃciency may not be appropriate if the market is not competitive such that
higher proﬁt does not mean lower cost. It is also possible that the privatized
state enterprises lose their privileges so that, while they may become more
eﬃcient, their proﬁt levels fall as a result of greater competition. Due to the
lack of information on the privatized enterprises, the paper assumes that
the ex-SOEs’ level of eﬃciency matches those of competing private com-
panies. This is quite a strong assumption given that former SOEs may re-
tain some of their former privileges or corporate practices.
The paper also tries to estimate the change in the size of cash ﬂow as a
proxy for the revenue-generation motive. Again, due to the absence of data
on privatized companies, the authors assume that extra revenue is gener-
ated from the one-time sale of the loss-generating portion of the business,
which is estimated by the percentage of output associated with losses. For
example, if 20 percent of the output constitutes the loss-generating por-
tion, it is assumed that 20 percent of the asset will be sold oﬀ. The addi-
tional revenue, then, is generated by the perpetual ﬂow of interest earnings
from the asset sale. I ﬁnd this method of estimating additional cash ﬂow
rather crude. First, for ﬁrms that produce many products or services, it is
almost impossible to determine which products or services generate losses.
Second, assuming that assets can be divided up in proportion to output is
unrealistic. Finally, asset valuation is one of the most diﬃcult processes.
Thus, one should avoid using asset values as proxies unless a very thorough
method of asset evaluation is undertaken.
Besides the sale of assets, the authors assume that there are unobserved
ﬂows of additional revenues generated from privatization that are propor-
tional to the remaining assets. The proportion depends on the observed
attributes of the enterprise, such as the industry to which it belongs and
how much reform has been implemented before. These are extremely vague
proxies and there are no clear explanations of how these variables add to
the additional ﬂow of revenue.
Another variable that represents the revenue motivation is the reduction
in government subsidies. Two proxies were used: One is the average actual
subsidy during 1992–1994, which is valid; the other is the accumulated bank
loan and interest payment, which is supposed to reﬂect the level of ﬁnancial
burden of the government. The latter is multiplied by an “index of burden
to the government.” This index takes the value of zero if the manager of the
particular SOE claims that the enterprise does not receive assistance from
the government in case of delayed payments of loan, and a value of 4 if the
228 David D. Li and Francis T. Luimanager claims that government ﬁnancial assistance is readily available. I
find this method of estimating government perceived ﬁnancial burden rather
arbitrary and subjective, undermining the validity of statistical results.
Finally, the proxies used for the political beneﬁts associated with an SOE
include the size of employment, total value of ﬁxed assets, and level of
supervising government agency. While regression results show that these
variables are statistically signiﬁcant, it is not certain that the chosen vari-
ables necessarily contribute to political beneﬁts. For example, the fact that
large SOEs are less likely to be privatized may be because of the more com-
plicated nature of the privatization, the limited size of the capital market,
or the government’s unwillingness to generate large-scale unemployment,
rather than the loss of political beneﬁts.
The ﬁnal point I would like to comment on is the lack of time dimension.
All variables are estimated and compared on a per-period basis, while in re-
ality government needs and demands are more immediate, due to future
uncertainties and various short-run constraints. In fact, short-sightedness
has been quoted as one of the reasons governments are likely to forgo po-
tential long-term eﬃciency gains that are uncertain and dispersed, while
favoring immediate ﬁnancial gains from sales of SOEs by ensuring that the
privatized SOEs maintain privileges that they used to enjoy.
Comment Yun-Wing Sung
The authors of the article have a unique data set covering Chinese SOEs
throughout twenty years of the reform era (1980–1999). The data are used
to test two theories of privatization: whether governments privatize to en-
hance enterprise eﬃciency (eﬃciency theory) or to increase government
revenue (revenue theory). The test rejects the eﬃciency theory and sup-
ports the revenue theory. The authors have used a unique data set to ad-
dress the positive question, “Why do governments privatize?” It is a very
valuable contribution to the literature.
The authors distinguish between enterprise eﬃciency and government
revenue enhancement, which are quite diﬀerent. However, the authors do
not distinguish between enterprise eﬃciency and social eﬃciency, which
also can be quite diﬀerent, especially under the conditions in China. For
instance, given arbitrary prices, which were quite prevalent in China in the
1980s, an enterprise suﬀering losses nevertheless may be socially eﬃcient.
The losses may be due to artiﬁcially inﬂated prices of input, or depressed
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nese University of Hong Kong.prices of output. In such a case, closing down the enterprise may lead to a
loss of social welfare.
For the purpose of the paper, enterprise eﬃciency is the appropriate con-
cept to use. As the authors have correctly argued, gains in enterprise eﬃ-
ciency are reﬂected in increase in rates of return to total assets after priva-
tization. Unfortunately, the authors have a tendency to use the concepts
of “enterprise eﬃciency” and “social eﬃciency” interchangeably. For in-
stance, in their discussion on the measurement of “eﬃciency gain, which
should refer to gains in enterprise eﬃciency, the authors argued that “Cut-
ting a surplus worker does increase social eﬃciency [italics added], as cap-
tured by  ei.” Cutting a surplus worker will increase enterprise eﬃciency.
Whether it increases social eﬃciency is quite uncertain. If the worker re-
mains unemployed after layoﬀ, there is no change in social eﬃciency.
In the concluding section of the paper, the authors again refer to social
eﬃciency. They seemed to have assumed that gains in enterprise eﬃciency
would automatically lead to gains in social eﬃciency. The authors should
have distinguished between the two concepts and spelled out the condi-
tions under which gains in enterprise eﬃciency would lead to gains in so-
cial eﬃciency.
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